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APPENDIX VIII
SUGGESTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY STUDY
IN this section it is desired to assist adult, workpeople who have limited time and opportunity for study, but wish to begin to read and think for themselves, and perhaps later to become members of a tutorial class.
The natural course to pursue would be to recommend sound elementary books on such subjects as economics, history, political science, &c., and an attempt is made to do so in the systematic courses given above, where the more useful books are marked with an asterisk. But it is necessary to state two things emphatically at the outset:
1. There is a very great need for new elementary books on these subjects. There exists a vast mass of textbook literature, which is being added to every month. But, from the point of view of this committee, these books suffer from three defects:
(a) They are generally written for children or young persons rather than for adults.
(b) They are generally not written for workpeople, or by persons who are in touch with workpeople.
(c) Very few of them deal with the subjects or branches of subjects in which workpeople are more specially interested. Most of the recognized 'school' subjects, such as languages, geography, divinity, grammar, mathematics, do not come within the purview of this committee.
For these reasons the committee passed a resolution (see p. 87) recommending the preparation of textbooks for working-class students on a number of subjects, and it is to be hoped that the proposed standing committee will take this matter energetically in hand. There is a certain amount of foreign experience to guide it in the work.
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2. A second point which must be made clear is that textbooks alone will not be sufficient for beginners in such difficult and complex subjects as political science and economics. In learning mathematics or a branch of natural science, such as geology or botany, a student may make great progress alone with a textbook; but in all studies dealing with human nature textbooks are certain to be inadequate guides. Textbook knowledge should be supplemented by conversation and discussion, and illuminated by the play of general ideas. The free intercourse of mind with mind, which is evoked by the study of such subjects, is one of the chief merits of the tutorial class, and one of the chief deprivations of isolated students and beginners. In order to assist in such discussion, we append a number of brief notes or suggestions compiled by two members of the committee on political subjects of current interest, not with the object of dogmatizing, but in order to illustrate the manner in which such subjects can be approached in the light of general ideas, and to suggest questions which may lead on to further study and reflection.
THE STUDY OF POLITICS OR POLITICAL SCIENCE
1. What kind of study is it?
By politics is not meant simply 'party' or 'practical' politics, which is concerned with 'programmes' and 'tactics', and how and when to put political ideas into practice, but politics as contemporary history.
There is a difference between contemporary history and past history. The former is, with a view to action, studied not (as a rule) by pure scholars who love knowledge for its own sake, but by men who regard knowledge as a means to an end.
Still it is a study to be undertaken in the spirit of the scholar, not of the propagandist. Sentiment and emotion are indispensable as the inspiration of political study; but they are harmful and disturbing as its accompaniment. The dispassionate spirit and specialized skill of the scientist is
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as necessary for thinking out political problems as for solving problems of electricity and engineering.
2. What is the subject of political study?
Not a fixed object or group of objects, as in natural science, but a multiform and changing object - Society.
Society is not a mechanism: it is simply the men, women, and children of the community as they act and react on one another: that is, in their social relations.
The political student studies human nature, then, but not individual men and women (like a biographer), nor a group of men and women in their feelings towards one another (like a novelist or dramatist), but men and women in their thoughts about politics and in their outward actions and relations, as 'political animals'.
This is a very difficult study, as 'political human nature' is constantly changing. It is impossible to lay down general laws, which are universally true, for a changing subject. The political student aims at discovering, not laws, but tendencies, which are true on the whole, but may often be falsified, as, for instance, by unforeseen events such as an earthquake or a bad harvest or an epidemic, or by the peculiarities of national temperament.
3. What are political students trying to bring about? What is the goal of political study?
It is best expressed in the watchword of the early Revolutionists - Liberty.
By Liberty is meant -
(i) Economic liberty:
A man is not free when he is hungry and naked; or when he procures food, shelter, and clothing only by an unhealthy or degrading occupation.
Under modern conditions economic liberty for the many can only be secured through social organization, curtailing some men's licence for other men's liberty.
(ii) Spiritual liberty:
A man is not free when he cannot think, speak, and write as he will, and act upon his opinions if he so desires.
Spiritual liberty for the many means freedom from
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authority; but it can only be secured by curtailing some men's licence to act (e. g. criminals or lunatics), or even, in rare cases, to speak and write, for other men's liberty.
The goal of the political student, then, is to remove obstacles to economic and spiritual liberty, and to provide opportunities for men and women and children to develop the good that is in them.
Where liberty begins, politics end.
The goal of political study is not:
(i) to change human nature;
(ii) to introduce any definite political or social or ethical system;
(iii) to secure liberty to any particular class or
(iv) any particular nation;
though any or all of these may turn out, through study, to be necessary steps or consequences.
The following are among some of the general questions arising for discussion out of the above:
1. Where ought the lines to be drawn between study, action (legislation, &c.), and propaganda? Which is the most valuable?
2. Ought knowledge to be pursued for its own sake, or only with a view to action?
3. Can politicians be both scientific and sentimental?
4. If the politicians who govern us ought to be as skilled in their trade as the engineers who build our bridges, why do we not use the same method for finding out the best man in each case? Why do we not either choose our bridge-builders by a democratic vote or our rulers by a committee of experts?
5. Does not an ignorant fanatic achieve more in politics than a skilled political thinker? Is not the use of the intellect in politics enervating?
6. Have politics any concern with private conduct and domestic life?
7. Have politics anything to teach us about a general law of human progress?
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8. Is self-governing democracy a necessary part of all successful social organization?
9. What right has the State to inflict punishment or otherwise to limit a man's freedom?
10. Can a wage-earner be considered economically free? Define economic liberty.
11. How can spiritual liberty be reconciled with any fixed system of religion or morality?
GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY
An impartial visitor from another planet, reflecting on our problems of government, would make three observations:
(i) That our world is, and has always been, very badly governed. We are only just beginning to recognize how much a wise government can achieve.
(ii) That governing is not a very difficult art; it requires much less technical skill and training than engineering or medicine. This can be observed by watching the government of any small community or group of men: e. g. a club, a cricket eleven out fielding, a District or Parish Council. Most men submit readily to authority wisely exercised.
(iii) That the natural way of managing government is to put the best man or group of men in command.
The modern idea of government seems the direct contrary of this last. Practically all civilized nations are under a democratic system of government: that is, they are ostensibly governed not by the few, but by the many: not by the knowledge of the few, but by the opinions of the many.
How is this difference to be explained?
Some light may be thrown upon it by tracing the history of the idea of democracy.
The idea of democracy took its origin among the ancient Greeks, who were the first people to discuss questions of government, and amongst whom government by the people, instead of being, as it is with us, a very artificial system,
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seemed the only natural one. This was due to several causes:
1. The climate, which caused them to spend most of their time in the open air. While 'the Englishman's home is his castle', the Greek was the 'real man in the street'. Public life took up as much of his time as private indoor life does of ours.
2. The low scale of production, coupled with the employment of slaves, gave the citizens far less to do in the economic sphere. Hence they had leisure to devote to government.
3. Governmental problems were so simple compared with ours that the need for experts was not felt. Mistakes of policy could be corrected without heavy penalties; for instance, as credit was not sufficiently developed to enable states to raise war loans, an unwise war came to an end when the money in the Treasury was exhausted.
Hence the Greeks, living together in small cities as a body of friends and equals, where most men knew one another by sight, evolved the idea of democracy.
This idea is really twofold, but its two aspects are generally confused:
(i) Fellowship democracy: democracy meaning a sense of brotherhood and equality diffused through the community, as through a harmonious school or club or village. This has not anything to do with government. A band of anarchists who disapproved of all government might still be democratic in this sense.
(ii) Self-governing democracy: democracy meaning that every member of the community has a share in its government. This does not (as a rule) exist in schools, but would be represented by the general meeting of any club or Trade Union.
After the decay of ancient Greek civilization the double idea of democracy slumbered for many centuries, at least in the political sphere. When it was revived in the North of Europe it had to adapt itself to altered conditions, such as -
(i) A 'stay-at-home' climate, with public business conducted, under uncomfortable conditions, indoors.
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(ii) Large nations, instead of small cities, as the units of national government, and increased complexity of problems of government.
Hence with us democracy is an artificial system, and requires justification.
Several theories have been invented to justify it.
(i) That every man is born into the world with a right to take part in the government of his country.
But this school have to admit that a man may forfeit this right. If so, who is to decide? What right has any one, or any majority, to take away a man's human birthright? This theory now finds few logical upholders.
(ii) That, though there is no natural right, it is expedient that every man should have a part in government.
This theory has been defended on two opposite grounds:
(a) 'Individualistic': men, it is said, always act from selfish motives; therefore if each is set free to pursue what is best for himself, the result will be to secure what is best for all.
Note that on this selfish theory of human nature fellowship democracy is impossible.
In accordance with this theory the franchise was extended and many grievances redressed. But it is not a true theory, for experience has shown that most men do not act in politics as individuals but in groups, whether actuated by selfish or unselfish motives.
(b) 'Socialistic': this school of thought claims that the responsibility of sharing in government creates fellowship democracy and so simplifies the problems of government. Government has failed in the past owing to the selfishness of the governors and the acquiescence of the governed: self-governing democracy will create unselfishness and public spirit.
But the Socialistic theory of democracy has also proved not wholly true. Why?
1. Experience shows that a self-governing democracy has peculiar temptations to selfishness: e.g.
(a) through the struggle of class against class;
(6) through the responsibility unexpectedly thrust upon
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the democracies of Western Europe of governing large and wealthy oversea dependencies.
2. Because even if unselfish, modern democracies are often unable to act rightly owing to
(a) The difficulty of securing accurate information, accentuated by an untrustworthy Press. (In the Greek democracies information was given by word of mouth.)
(b) Lack of time. The modern citizen has mostly only a few moments in a crowded day for his citizenship.
3. Modern self-governing democracy works entirely through representatives. But a real representative system, by which one man becomes the mouthpiece of some hundreds or thousands of others is, humanly speaking, impossible: and would be undesirable, if it were possible. The modern representative is not a reflection of his constituents but a man with certain qualifications, of which the chief are:
(a) Leisure (unless he is paid for his services).
(b) The qualities of a 'good candidate' (which are not necessarily those of a good governor).
Hence, though the trend of events seems to be setting in favour of fellowship democracy, self-governing democracy seems, at the present moment, to be losing ground.
For instance:
the Cabinet is gaining at the expense of the House of Commons:
the permanent Civil Servant at the expense of his temporary chief:
the municipal official at the expense of the local representative:
the Trades Union Secretary at the expense of the General Meeting.
In other words, self-governing democracy may be un- necessary if we can secure without it a government that is (i) unselfish, (2) wise and well-informed.
Can we? Probably not, for government, in order to be unselfish and well-informed, must be in touch with those whom it governs: unelected governors may have all the other
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scientific knowledge necessary to good legislation and administration but will lack knowledge of the people.
For the management of things expert knowledge alone is necessary: but for the government of men a democratic system appears to be indispensable.
Hence there is a real necessity for a directly elected element in government, and for a division of labour between the representatives of the two kinds of knowledge.
The government of the future seems likely to be a calculated combination of scientific efficiency with popular control.
This control could be exercised in numerous ways, amongst others by
(i) Criticism: not only in Parliament but in the Press and at public meetings.
(ii) Publicity: the acts of the executive and its reasons for action should be laid before the public.
(iii) Consultation: by the principle of co-option citizens representative of important groups and organizations can be chosen to serve on public bodies. (This assumes a condition of fellowship democracy.)
(iv) By the constant pressure of a majority of elected representatives upon their administrative chiefs by their power of passing a vote of no confidence.
The above theoretical sketch is not put forward as an explanation of the causes of the development of democratic government. These must be sought through study of the political and economic conditions of ancient and modern societies. But ideas and theories are always in intimate relation with these conditions and are a useful guide towards their understanding.
The following are among some of the general questions arising for discussion out of the above:
1. How can men best be trained to become governors?
2. What are the qualities of a good leader?
3. Is climate the most important cause in determining social habits?
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4. Is a slave-system a necessity to secure a high standard of culture and civilization among the free?
5. Is a nation or city justified in raising a loan at the expense of posterity?
6. Is fellowship democracy possible under modern conditions of specialization?
7. Is it true to call the Middle Ages a really democratic age? Is the Catholic Church a democratic institution?
8. Has a man any natural rights?
9. Do men act from purely self-regarding motives?
10. How would the various modern theories of democracy apply to women?
11 . What attitude ought a modern democracy to take up as to the government of its dependencies?
12. Should members of Parliament regard themselves as delegates or hold themselves free to act independently?
13. What are the differences between a 'good candidate' and a good member?
14. Do permanent officials generally enjoy the confidence of those whose affairs they administer?
15. On what system should permanent officials be selected for their posts?
1 6. How can a governor best keep in touch with the people he governs?
17. What are the limits of publicity and secrecy in government deliberations?
18. Is co-option of representatives of voluntary organizations a democratic principle?
19. Are ad hoc bodies better than mixed committees?
WAR
War is generally regarded as a blot on modern civilization. It is in contradiction with civilized man's instincts. (Hence all armies go out with doctors and nurses who tend the wounded of either side.)
If so, can war be abolished?
Three questions arise:
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1. Why do we condemn war?
(a) Because of the suffering it involves, both among combatants and non-combatants.
(b) Because of the brutality it involves, by causing men to kill one another.
(c) Because of the destruction of wealth it involves and consequent effects on trade and employment and national prosperity.
2. Is modern warfare different in these three respects from the warfare of earlier ages?
Yes. Warfare is now a science; it used to be a sport. Next to hunting, it is the oldest form of sport. Hence:
(a) In early warfare fewer men were killed; it is very hard to kill a man in armour. A battle was often like a football scrimmage, followed by a pursuit. Men could be killed in the pursuit, but armies generally preferred looting the camp to killing the fugitives.
(b) Fighting was an excitement, entered upon in hot blood. There was very little scientific and calculated killing. Modern fighting is best done in cold blood.
(c) War was a means of increasing wealth: prisoners were used as slaves or, among cannibals, as food: treasure was carried off. A modern nation which goes to war for profit calculates to make its profit not in the war but after the war.
Hence modern scientific warfare is a new phenomenon, at once more destructive and more intellectual than fighting in the days before fire-arms were introduced.
3. What purposes does modern warfare serve?
Two purposes:
(i) As a means of gain.
(ii) As an ultimate way of settling national differences.
Taking (i) first, war may be undertaken as a means of gain either by ruling individuals or by democratic States.
(a) By individuals:
Powerful individuals or groups of individuals (kings or ministers from ambition or for popularity, financiers, contractors and others for commercial motives) may drive an
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undemocratically governed nation into war. Most European wars in the eighteenth century were due to personal or dynastic considerations. But this policy received a check when the peoples of Western Europe rose against Napoleon, and should gradually pass away with the increase in the power and knowledge of democracies.
(b) By States:
Modern nations may go to war to win:
(i) Territory:
But one democratic nation cannot annex and govern another democratic nation for long against its will. For instance, Sweden could not annex and hold Norway (and so avoided a war in 1905 in spite of great provocation), nor Germany France (and so was content with an indemnity in 1871), nor Turkey Bulgaria. The stronger the national spirit of a people the less worth while it is to annex it. Hence wars for territory may be expected to cease when, as in many parts of Europe at present, the frontiers between States correspond to real differences of civilization and national life.
(ii) Modern nations may go to war for commercial gain:
(a) To secure markets for their manufactured goods: in old days nations occupied new territory to fetch treasure home; modern nations often do so to bring their own treasures and find buyers for them. They occupy a country containing uncivilized people with many needs, and induce them (generally in return for their labour) to satisfy these out of home manufactures. This benefits sections of the nation, for it enriches the home manufacturers and increases home production.
But this process is not likely to continue indefinitely, for
(1) There are very few such 'virgin markets' left, and even these cannot be occupied without international complications.
(2) It is not the best way of increasing home production and employment. It might be, if there were no people at home with similar needs; but in that case there would be no desire to increase production.
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(b) Nations may go to war to exploit the undeveloped resources of new countries. For instance, a manufacturing country may be driven to use political means to secure its food and raw material, and this may lead to war. But a powerful manufacturing country is likely to secure this more safely by negotiation than by war.
War as an ultimate way of settling national differences:
It will always remain the 'ultimate' way, as duelling and horsewhipping remain between individuals. But civilized nations are less and less likely to resort to it, and have developed checks to ensure this.
Such checks are:
(a) Arbitration.
The principle of arbitration is that a nation is as unfit as an individual to be judge in its own case. When this is recognized by the establishment of .a permanent international court for settling international questions many difficulties will be regularly settled without ill-feeling (as civil cases between individuals), and a body of international law, with precedents, will gradually grow up. The decisions of such a court may never be binding- on nations; but few nations would care to dispute them. Moreover they will give time for reflection, and so prevent hasty action.
(b) The increase of international communication and mutual understanding.
The cheapening of travel, the rise in wages, and the improvement of education may gradually make it uncommon for English people not to have been outside England and to speak no language but their own. Every excursion train to Paris or the Rhine is an additional safeguard against a war with France or Germany. International marriages will probably always be rare: but international friendships need not be so.
(c) International movements. These are
(i) Specifically peace or anti-militarist:
Such a movement, if international, may turn the scale against war at a critical moment.
(ii) Political: e.g. the Liberal and Nationalist movement in
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the nineteenth century and the Socialist movement today. A working-class international movement is a particular security against war, because
(a) the interests of the worker are always in favour of peace. Like most employers, he is sure of an immediate loss; but his ultimate gain is even more problematical.
(b) The common soldiers are drawn from the working class; and governments may hesitate to risk a war against the feelings of the class from which their fighters are drawn.
(iii) Scientific or learned:
Learning and science are international and internationally organized. This is drawing together an international body of enlightened opinion which could make itself heard in time of crisis. Few modern states would care to enter upon a War with all the 'intellectuals' opposed to them.
But in spite of these tendencies and checks two causes of war remain:
(i) Ultimate incompatibilities of temper between nations (religious, racial, or temperamental) which may induce nations to go to war against their own interest.
(ii) Unfixed frontiers between nations and, especially, between widely distinct races.
A powerful nation wishes to spread its civilization and influence as widely as possible: and it can do so till it is checked by an opposing civilization. Fluctuating frontiers generally mean sparsely populated or undeveloped countries, and the struggle for the tutelage of them is a struggle between civilizations. Many nations think (and may continue to think) war in such a cause justifiable. The best safeguard is to make it unprofitable.
The following are some of the general questions arising for discussion out of the above:
1. What is the difference between war and murder?
2. Is it true to say that women are no use in war?
3. What effects does war have on the character of those engaged in fighting?
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4. Is it right to condemn an institution because it causes pain?
5. Is the destruction of property good or bad for trade?
6. Is a sport to be condemned as exercising a bad influence because it involves danger to life?
7. What interests in a civilized community stand to benefit peculiarly by the outbreak of war?
8. Are fresh markets necessary to national prosperity?
9. What uncivilized parts of the world are not yet under the tutelage of a civilized power?
10. Ought manufacturing nations to aim at possessing the sources of their food-supply and raw material?
11. Is it true to say that physical force is the 'ultimate basis' of society?
12. Ought nations to submit questions affecting the national honour to arbitration?
13. Are international marriages desirable?
14. Are the attacks of the anti-militarists on patriotic sentiment justifiable? If not, ought they to be repressed by law?
15. Can an international political movement be effectively organized?
16. Is a universal secondary language, such as Esperanto, likely to be generally adopted for international intercourse?
Is there any other way of remedying the difficulty of international intercourse?
17. Is it justifiable for a nation to go to war, against its own material interests, to extend its civilization?
18. What are the most important debatable frontiers still left between races and nations?
19. Which are the most important factors in bringing about mutual incompatibilities of temper between nations: differences of race, of religion, or of civilization and standards of life?
THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge in the modern world has to contend against two enemies:
(i) Opinion: 'the wish is father to the thought': most
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men are indolent enough to prefer believing to knowing, and this natural tendency has been strengthened by the democratic system by which the opinions of the voter decide the destinies of the country.
Opinion is very often, though not always, dictated by sentiment.
(ii) Interest: men who possess or control knowledge may find it profitable to conceal or distort it.
The problem of the organization of knowledge is that of dissociating it from opinion and private interest. There is vastly more knowledge available in the world today than in any previous age. (The Encyclopaedia Britannica contains a hundredfold more knowledge than similar compilations by ancient Greeks or Romans.)
This knowledge is sought:
(i) For its own sake, and to find out new knowledge.
This use is made of it by research students at Universities and Academies, and only indirectly affects society.
(ii) For action.
Owing to the complication of modern life more knowledge is needed for action than ever before, both in private and in public life.
For instance in private life, men need to know enough to use the facilities provided for them, trains, telegraphs, bicycles, maps, books. A journey from point to point in London would baffle a Julius Caesar come to life again.
In public life, statesmen need exact knowledge (statistics, &c.) of a sort unknown to previous ages.
Modern life is based on a foundation of knowledge, most of it stored up in books, which is a common inheritance, and those who do not possess it are cut off from the common atmosphere of their time.
How is this knowledge to be passed on from old to young from one generation to the next?
This question forms the subject of many 'educational theories'.
(i) The simplest way is by compulsion and drudgery. Thus boys are sometimes taught swimming by being thrown into
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the water, and a new language by being made to learn the rules of its grammar by heart.
This is not teaching at all. When the boy learns it is because he teaches himself.
(ii) As a reaction from this arose the laissez-faire theory, that a child should be allowed to develop in his own way by the natural growth of his faculties. This theory believes in teaching by guidance and example, but not by compulsion.
But it ignores the artificial character of modern knowledge. No child can 'discover' how to read and write (as he might discover how to play ball or row) by the 'natural growth of his faculties', It may be true that children in growing up go through all the early stages of our race, but these stages can be hastened.
Hence the laissez-faire theory of education has been gradually abandoned and superseded by the idea of State-controlled education.
(iii) State-controlled education, which was first systematized in Prussia in 1817, expresses two ideas:
(a) That knowledge should be universally diffused, and hence compulsorily imparted.
Till the nineteenth century hardly any one could read or write: book-learning was for the few. The people got their knowledge by word of mouth or through works of art (e.g. Italian art familiarized people who could not read the Bible with the Bible stories). Hence the greater national importance of art in previous ages.
(b) That knowledge should be impartial: i.e. given with no ulterior motive: neither imparted in schools run for private profit nor given for non-educational (i.e. professional or propagandist) purposes.
In previous ages knowledge was generally given to those who could pay for it, and its vendors had to suit the taste of their customers: or it was given to priests or lawyers or soldiers or doctors for professional purposes. The only State-Education among the ancient Greeks was military in character. Hence restrictions were put upon knowledge which was regarded as unsuitable or dangerous, and even the
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Universities have been slow to abolish tests of orthodox opinion.
The theory of State-controlled education regards knowledge as a public possession (like air or sunshine), and its effective bestowal as a public concern.
The English State-controlled system of education may be regarded as defective and unsatisfactory, for four main reasons:
1. It was created and is still too largely used for one class only, and that the poorest class, which was unable to provide for its own education. Just as the public workhouse was founded as the paupers' workshop, so the public school house was founded as a school for the poor man's child. But if knowledge is a public concern, the State should not confine its attention to controlling the education of one class only. A national system of education concerns all classes.
2. It is imparted too exclusively through books. Books are store-houses of knowledge, but they are necessarily out of touch with life. Hence a system of education working (as it must) through books is open to the temptation to impart dead facts rather than knowledge of living interest. This can be corrected by drawing teachers and students of different conditions and classes together and promoting sympathy between them. A school should not be regarded as a barracks or a prison, but as a meeting-place of friends with common interests in study.
3. It is too short; systematic education should, if possible, take each student as far as he can get. Some will be taken further than others; but the present leaving age would certainly, under an improved system, be regarded as too low.
4. It is too cheap.
The imparting of knowledge is a skilled trade which requires expensive tools and good remuneration. The early traditions of our system have made men slow to recognize this.
State-controlled education does not necessarily mean State-managed or even State-supported education. It means that the State can inspect and report on every school; but, above
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all, that every teacher feels that (by whomsoever he is employed) he is doing public work for the nation.
Educational institutions with endowments which do not require State support may be valuable through their traditions of learning and discussion and their freedom to make experiments. Professional schools are of course necessary, in addition to purely educational schools, in order to train men to earn their livelihood in some specialized occupation.
But the education of the young is only part of the wider question of organizing the production and distribution of knowledge.
The men who produce knowledge are the men with ideas: poets, artists, scientists, inventors, scholars. Under modern conditions it is difficult for a man to earn his livelihood by producing knowledge. Men are no longer burned or imprisoned for new ideas; but they are sometimes starved, and more often discouraged.
New ideas need organization and endowment; for instance, there is particular need for endowment of research in departments like medicine, where it may be possible to extirpate many diseases.
The distribution of knowledge opens up wide questions, for practically every brain-worker is a knowledge-carrier: architect, journalist, clergyman, Civil Servant, lawyer, actor, publisher, advertiser.
Many ways could be conceived in which the idea of knowledge as a public possession could be applied to these professions.
E. g. by State publishing of valuable books, maps, music, &c., by publicly managed theatres or operas, by public control of town-planning and building, public hoardings for accurate news instead of private advertisements, &c., &c.
All plans for the organization of knowledge presuppose a population physically fit to profit by it. This raises wider questions, connected with the problem of poverty, which are beyond the scope of this section.
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The following are some of the general questions arising for discussion out of the above:
1. What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? Are there any regions of thought where there is no difference?
2. In what main directions are we wiser than the ancient Greeks and Romans?
3. Has the increase of knowledge altered human nature or the human intellect?
4. Is it a true educational maxim that 'example is better than precept'?
5. To what extent should children be allowed to form their own habits?
6. What is the educational value of art?
7. Is it bad that some schools should be run for private profit?
8. Should the elementary school be made the school of all classes?
9. Is it true that 'a good book is a better companion than a good friend'?
10. How long ought children who will have to earn their living as wage-earners to remain at school?
11. If education is run too cheaply where ought the extra money to come from?
12. Ought the State to manage education from the elementary school to the University?
13. What policy should the State adopt towards old educational endowments?
14. Compare the advantages of public and private patronage of new ideas.
15. Is competition the best stimulus for new ideas?
16. Is there any Trades Unionism among 'professional men' (brain-workers)? Is competition in this sphere in any way restricted?
17. How can the State organization of impartial knowledge be reconciled with party government? Would not the party in power inculcate its own opinions?
A. E. ZIMMERN.
J. M. MACTAVISH.